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RECONSIDERING THE LEGALITY OF HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION: LESSONS FROM KOSOVO
JULIE MERTUS*

For nearly ten years, human rights advocates tried to focus
public attention on Kosovo. They issued report after report of
gross and systemic human rights abuses in the troubled region.
Nearly all of the reports detailed crimes committed by Serb
civilians and Serb police against Albanian civilians.' They
warned of escalating violence and impending forced deportations, and implored intergovernmental organizations and individual countries to take preventative action.2 International
policymakers had overwhelming evidence that the pressure in
Kosovo was mounting and that an even greater human rights
disaster loomed near.' Yet they treated the warnings as those of
the boy who cried "wolf." Without the "wolf"of all-out war, inter-

* Assistant Professor of Law, Ohio Northern University, author of KOSOVO: HOW
MYTHS AND TRUTHS STARTED A WAR (1999). As of 2000, the author will be on the
faculty of American University's School of International Service and may be contacted
at suitcase@igc.org. The author acknowledges the support of the Ohio Northern University faculty summer research stipend and the research assistance of Katherine
Guernsey and Barbara Wilson in the preparation of this Essay. In addition, the
author would like to thank Paul Szasz and Jeff Walker for their suggestions.
1. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH HELSINKI, OPEN WOUNDS: HUMAN RIGHTS

ABUSES IN KOSOVO (1994); Human Rights Watch, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia:
Humanitarian Law Violations in Kosovo (last modified Oct. 1998) <http://www.
hrw.orgreports98/kosovo/>.; Systematic Rights Abuses Reported in Kosovo, NEW EUROPE ON-LINE, Aug. 28, 1999, available in 1998 WL 24015766.
2. See Amnesty International, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: Time the Authorities Listened and Acted! (last modified Apr. 29, 1998) <http://www.amnesty.org.uk/
news/press/releases/29_april1998-5.shtml>; Amnesty International, Violence Sweeps
Through Kosovo Province: InternationalEffort Needed to Prevent FurtherKillings and
Beatings (last modified Mar. 5, 1998) <http://www.amnesty.org.uk/news/press/releases/
5_march_1998-1.shtml>; International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, Kosovo:
Time Is Running Out (last modified Sept. 1, 1998) <httpi/www.ihf-hr.orgappeals
/hr.org/appeala/hr.org/appeals/980830.htm>.
3. See Peter Humphrey, Albanians Victims of Serbian Police, NEWSDAY, June 1,
1993, available in 1993 WL 11375416; Neil King Jr., Hague Panel May Indict
Milosevic: Kosovo Killings Could Prompt Charges, WALL ST. J. EUR., Mar. 16, 1998,
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national leaders failed to treat Kosovo seriously. Indeed, international leaders failed to treat the Kosovo situation seriously
even after many Albanians grew impatient with their campaign
of "passive resistance" to Serb aggression and instead supported
a new tactic of armed resistance. This situation became even
more drastic at the end of 1997 when the Kosovo Liberation

Army (KLA) was at the vanguard of armed resistance. 4 Still,

international leaders failed to take preventative action. Even
after the hot spring of 1998, when Serb forces killed fifty-one
members of an Albanian family in retaliation for KLA provocation,5 and after the summer of 1998, when Serb forces began a
scorched-earth policy of destroying whole villages,6 international
leaders obstinately refused to take effective action. Indeed, even
after the Milosevic regime reneged on its October 1998 agreement to decrease its forces in Kosovo7 and instead continued attacks on civilians,8 murdering forty-one civilians in the village of
Racak in January 1999, 9 the international community still preavailable in 1998 WL-WSJE 3512577; U.S. Dep't of State, Serbia-Montenegro Country
Report on Human Rights Practices for 1996 (last modified Jan. 30, 1997)
<http'//www.usis.usemb.se/human/human96/serbiamo.html>; U.S. Dep't of State, SerbiaMontenegro Human Rights Practices, 1995 (last modified Mar. 1996) <http://www.
usis.usemb.se/human/human95/serbiamo.htm>.
4. See FRIENDS OF BOSNIA, KOSOVO: WAR AND PEACE IN THE BALKANS 3 (undated
factsheet).
5. See id.
6. See Human Rights Watch, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: HumanitarianLaw
Violations in Kosovo (last modified Oct. 1998) <http'J/www.hrw.orglreports98/kosovo/>;
see also Physicians for Human Rights, Action Alert: Kosovo Crisis; Aid in the Balkans (last modified Aug. 1998) <http://www.phrusa.orgcampaignskosovo.html> (reporting extensively about the "intensive systematic destruction and ethnic cleansing
of villages by Serb police"); Physicians for Human Rights, Medical Group Recounts
Individual Testimonies of Human Rights Abuses in Kosovo (last modified June 24,
1998) <http'/www.phrusa.org/research/kosovo2.html> (reporting "serious human rights
violations, including detentions, arbitrary arrests, violent beatings and rape, throughout Kosovo during the past six months").
7. See Linda D. Kozaryn, NATO Orders Air Strikes to End 'HumanitarianCatastrophe" (last modified Mar. 24, 1999) <http:/www.defenselink.mil/newsfMar1999/n0324
1999_9903244.html>.
8. See Human Rights Watch, Detentions and Abuse in Kosovo (last modified Dec.
1998) <http:/www.hrw.orgfreports98/kosovo2/>.
9. See Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch Investigation Finds: Yugoslav
Forces Guilty of War Crimes in Racak, Kosovo (last modified Jan. 29, 1999)
<http:J/www.hrw.org/hrw/press/1999/an/yugo-prs.htm>; see also Human Rights Watch,
A Week of Terror in Drenica (visited Apr. 1, 2000) <http-//www.hrw.org/hrw/reports/
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tended that Kosovo was a small matter that would go away
quietly. 10
In March 1999, the "Contact group'"-United States, Britain,
France, Germany, Italy, and Russia-brought Kosovar and Serbian negotiators together in Rambouillet, France. The agreement
on the table required autonomy to be restored to Kosovo, a
NATO peacekeeping force to be installed, the KLA to disarm,
and Milosevic to reduce his troops in Kosovo. Neither side liked
the arrangement.
The agreement was unacceptable to Kosovars because it failed
to require the complete withdrawal of Serbian troops and the
guarantee of independence. At the same time, it was unacceptable to Serbs who refused to give up Kosovo and to permit the
presence of an armed international military force. NATO threatened both sides: Kosovars would be cut off from any international
support if they failed to sign and Serbia would be bombed if they
failed to sign. Kosovars eventually signed the agreement, but
Serbia refused. Then, on March 23, 1999, NATO war planes
commenced military air operations and missile strikes in Yugoslavia. Suddenly, Kosovo was a lead story in every media outlet.' Kosovo finally came into focus, but the optic was blurred.
In a rush to "do the right thing" or just "do anything" many
human rights advocates, like the diplomats and pundits they
criticized, started to get sloppy. They accepted a false slate of
diametrically opposed choices-intervention or no intervention;
protection of Serbian sovereignty or denial of Serbian sovereignty
-without questioning what each choice actually meant under
international law and without listening to the reasons proffered
by the intervenors themselves.

1999/kosovo/> (documenting violations of international humanitarian law during the
last week of September 1998).
10. See Fred Abrahams, The West Winks at Serbian Atrocities in Kosovo, INTL
HERALD TRIB., Aug. 5, 1998, at 6, available in 1998 WL 4793339.
11. See, e.g., Stephen Castle, European Elections: Swing to Apathy in Every Part
of Europe, INDEPENDENT (LONDON), June 14, 1999, at 9, available in 1999 WL
15752459; Norman Harper, Live a Moment of History, ABERDEEN PRESS & J., May 6,
1999, at 16, available in LEXIS, News Library, Abdnpj File; R.C. Longworth, Bridge
to Brighter Future Must Span Ancient Hate, CaY. TRIB., May 30, 1999, at 1, available in 1999 WL 2878571; US Newspapers Roll Victory Drums in Kosovo Crisis,
AGENCE FR. PRESSE, June 4, 1999, available in 1999 WL 2615928.
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Renowned human rights advocates, such as Czech President
Vaclav Havel, offered human rights rationales for NATO's actions. Havel claimed that the alliance "acted out of respect for
human rights" and that the war was "probably the first war that
has not been waged in the name of 'national interests,' but rather
the name of principle and values."' 2 If only this were true, the
legitimacy of actions in Kosovo would be much clearer. The
Clinton Administration considered but refused to base its actions
in Kosovo solely on humanitarian grounds. Instead, the Clinton
Administration, like other international leaders who have intervened in nation-states in the past,13 offered an array of justifications. Although humanitarian concerns were included "because
we care about saving innocent lives,"'4 they were rolled together
with other factors, most prominently: (1) the need for regional
stabilization, or in Clinton's words, "because our children need
and deserve a peaceful, stable, free Europe"; 5 (2) national security concerns relating to a long war and a large refugee flow,
"because we have an interest in avoiding an even crueler and
costlier war";' and (3) the need to protect NATO's reputation,
because looking the other way "would discredit NATO, the cornerstone on which our security has rested for 50 years."'7 As
Clinton explained these factors to the nation in his first public
address on NATO intervention in Kosovo, he emphasized
America's economic and security concerns, not humanitarianism:
[I]f America is going to be prosperous and secure, we need a
Europe that is prosperous, secure undivided and free ....
That is why I have supported the political and economic unification of Europe. That is why we brought Poland, Hungary

12. Vaclav Havel, Kosovo and the End of the Nation-State, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS,
June 10, 1999, at 6, available in 1999 WL 9802362.
13. Sean Murphy's review of incidents of intervention demonstrates that "government officials of the intervening state (rightly or wrongly) based the legality of that
state's action on one or more other reasons." See SEAN D. MURPHY, HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION: THE UNITED NATIONS IN AN EVOLVING WORLD ORDER 85 (1996).
14. Address to the Nation on Airstrikes Against Serbian Targets in the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), 35 WEEKLY CONP. PRES. DbC. 516,
518 (Mar. 24, 1999).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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and the Czech Republic into NATO, and redefined its missions... 18
In the Administration's announcements, White House spokesmen also stressed that "NATO had to address the problem [in
Kosovo] now19 because a failure to act would have destroyed its
credibility."
Dr. Javier Solana, Secretary-General of NATO, similarly offered an array of extralegal justifications for NATO intervention
in Kosovo. In his first address after the onset of NATO bombing,
Solana emphasized more clearly than had President Clinton that
NATO's "objective is to prevent more human suffering and more
repression and violence against the civilian population of
Kosovo."2" At the same time, Solana stated that the military
action was necessary to "prevent instability spreading in the
region"21 and to "support the political aims of the international
community."2 2 Specifically, he characterized NATO's efforts as
"support[ing] international efforts to secure Yugoslav agreement
to an interim political settlement."2 3 This latter justification-the
use of force to coerce a political leader to sign an agreement-clearly was extralegal. Indeed, under the 1969 Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, "[a] treaty is void if its conclusion has been procured by the threat or use of force.... "24
Thus, under the 1969 Vienna Convention, legal justifications for
the use of force in Kosovo should have been offered apart from
the mere desire to force a political leader to sign a "take it or
leave it" agreement.2 5

18. Id.
19. Jim Garamone & Linda D. Kozaryn, NATO Attacks Serbs to Stop Kosovo Killings (last modified Mar. 24, 1999) <http:/www.defenselink.mil/news/Marl999/
n03241999_9903245.html> (quoting White House spokesman Joe Lockhart).
20. Dr. Javier Solana, Press Statement (last modified Mar. 23, 1999) <http://www.
nato.intdocu/pr/1999/p99-040e.htm>.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 8 I.L.M. 679, 698.
25. Serbia did make a counteroffer. Although the proposal would have rejected the
presence of NATO troops in Kosovo, it would have permitted the presence of other
unarmed internationals. For the text of the proposal, see Rambouillet (visited Apr. 1,
2000) <http'//www.jurist.law.pitt.edu/kosovo.htm#Rambouillet>.
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By failing to specify clearly the legal parameters of their actions, the NATO allies exposed themselves to criticism suggesting that NATO was not operating under any legal grounds at
all.2 6 Critics who argue that a humanitarian and human rights
disaster did not exist in Kosovo before NATO attacks are wrong
on the facts, however. By the time NATO began bombing,
Kosovo Albanians had faced more than ten years of intense
human rights violations under the boot of Serb forces.28 In the
summer of 1998 alone, attacking Yugoslav and Serb paramilitary forces shelled an estimated three hundred thousand Kosovo
Albanians out of their homes. 29 Thus, contrary to the critics'
factual contentions, the wealth of information on gross and systemic human rights abuses in Kosovo prior to the NATO bombing provided sufficient evidence of a human rights basis for
intervention. Nonetheless, many of the same critics point to

26. See, e.g., Raju G.C. Thomas, NATO and International Law (visited Apr. 1,
2000) <http'//www.jurist.law.pitt.edu/thomas.htm>.
27. See Robert Hayden, Humanitarian Hypocrisy (visited Apr. 1, 2000) <http//
www.jurist.law.pitt.edu/hayden.htm>. Hayden claims that "the wide Serbian offensive
against Kosovo Albanians began after NATO's attacks began." Id. Though the Serbian
all-out war against the Albanians commenced after NATO bombing, the nine years
of intense Serbian harassment of Albanians provided the crux of NATO's humanitarian
argument, not the postbombing deportations and murders. Hayden contends further
that "Yugoslav forces, until NATO attacks on them commenced, were fighting a
guerrilla force, in much the same way that American forces had fought in Vietnam."
Id. Setting aside disputes regarding America's actions in Vietnam and the validity of
these actions, Hayden's statements ignore the wealth of documentation that Yugoslav
forces, Serbian police, and paramilitary troops were directly targeting civilians in
Kosovo. For example, Physicians for Human Rights concluded, after extensive study,
that:
Serb forces have engaged in a systematic and brutal campaign to forcibly
expel the ethnic Albanian[] population of Kosovo throughout the province.
In the course of these mass deportations, and over the past year in
Kosovo, Serb forces have committed widespread violations of human
rights against ethnic Albanians including- killings, beatings, torture, sexual
assault, separation and disappearances, shootings, looting and destruction
of property, and violations of medical neutrality.
See Physicians for Human Rights, War Crimes in Kosovo (last modified June 15,
1999) <httpl//www.phrusa.org/new/kexec.html>.
28. See Julie Mertus, The Obvious Next Step-NATO Complicit in Genocide: Send
Ground Troops Now, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 1, 1999, available in 1999 WL 2859071.
29. See Julie Mertus, InternationalDisplacement in Kosovo: The Impact on Women
and Children (last modified Apr. 21, 1999) <http:/www.law.onu.edu/organizations
/interational/displaced.htm>.
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valid legal concerns about the extensive list of various justifications for intervention that contained many questionable items,
most notably, the desire to use force to coerce the signing of an
agreement or the use of force to protect one's own reputation or
the reputation of friends. 0
Some champions of intervention openly acknowledged the
illegality of the air strikes, but claimed moral legitimacy for
such actions. 1 Straying from legal justifications, however, the
risks delegitimized international law and dismantled the gains
of human rights advocates over the past decade. International
law generally, and human rights law specifically, are most influential when communities perceive their terms as legitimate and
fair. 32 Legitimacy is central to the enforcement of human
rights. 33 Accordingly, only human rights processes and bodies
perceived as legitimate will be taken seriously, and only states
perceived as legitimate can enforce human rights norms successfully.3 4 As Thomas Franck explains:
In a community organized around rules, compliance is secured-to whatever degree it is-at least in part by perception of a rule as legitimate by those to whom it is addressed .... [Plerception of legitimacy... becomes a crucial

30. See generally Hayden, supra note 27 (examining the hypocrisy of NATO hu-

manitarian intervention); Thomas, supra note 26 (outlining the key violations of international law NATO committed).
31. Antonio Cassese, Ex Iniuria Is Oritur: Are We Moving Towards International
Legitimation of Forcible HumanitarianCountermeasures in the World Community? 10
EUR. J. INTL L. 23 (1999) (last modified May 11, 1999) <http'J/www.ejil.org/journal/
Voll0Nol/com.html>; Hayden, supra note 27; Bruno Simma, NATO, the UN and the
Use of Force: Legal Aspects, 10 EUR. J. INVL L. 1 (1999) (last modified Apr. 26,
1999) <http'J/www.ejil.org/journal/Vol10/Nol/abl-l.html>.
32. See THOMAS M. FRANcK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS

(1995) [hereinafter FRANCK, FAIRNESS]; THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS (1990) [hereinafter FRANCK, POWER]; see also Jose Alvarez,
The Quest for Legitimacy: An Examination of the Power of Legitimacy Among Na-

tions by Thomas M. Franck, 24 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 199 (1991) (reviewing
FRANCI, POWER, supra).

33. See Fernando R. Tes6n, The Kantian Theory of International Law, 92 COLUM.
L. REV. 53, 81-84 (1992) (asserting the notion that human rights protections are elementary to the legitimacy of states).
34. See generally W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary InternationalLaw, 84 AM. J. INTL L. 866, 867 (1990) (explaining the concept
of popular sovereignty).
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factor... in the capacity of any rule to secure compliance
when, as in the international system, there are no other compliance-inducing mechanisms. 5
Ad hoc justifications for the use of force, or the failure to use
force, render the resulting actions and inactions indeterminate,
and thus open to criticism as illegitimate. 6 Whenever a political
leader announces numerous and conflicting justifications for
intervention, the determinacy of rules on the use of force are
undermined and the status of the entire field of international
law suffers.
At the same time, determinacy of rules alone does not necessarily comport with justice. Franck terms blind compliance with
simple rules, "idiot rules," when the very simplicity of the rules
leads to injustice, incoherence, and absurdity upon consistent
application. To be perceived as legitimate and fair, the rules
and their application must comport with notions of justice. In
other words, a rule must be deemed just at both a substantive
and a procedural level. If the principle of nonintervention becomes an oversimplified "idiot rule" that cannot be applied fairly
to all circumstances, international leaders must articulate rules
more in concert with principles of justice and fairness. At the
very least, in order to be considered both legitimate and fair, the
process by which decisions on intervention are made should be
transparent, accountable, and open to participation from interested groups. 8 In the Kosovo context, international leaders not
only failed to base their decision to intervene in international
law, they also failed to make their decision in a transparent,
accountable, and open process. 9
This Essay argues for reconsideration of the justifications for
humanitarian intervention grounded in the most basic source of

35. Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in the InternationalSystem, 82 AM. J. INTL L.
705, 706 (1988).
36. See FRANCK, POWER, supra note 32, at 50-66.
37. See id. at 67-83.
38. Today, these norms are recognized as essential elements of several areas of
international law and practice. See Karen Ann Widess, Implementing Democratization: What Role for International Organizations?, 91 AM. SOc'Y INTL. PRoc. 356, 360
(1997) (remarks of Gregory H. Fox).
39. This point is elaborated further in Julie Mertus, Doing Democracy Differently,
THMD WORLD LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming 2000).
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international law-the United Nations Charter. Some commentators have argued for "new law" or for an "emerging norm" that
would permit humanitarian intervention.4" This is not necessary;
existing law offers ample support for assessing the legality of
the NATO intervention in Serbia proper and Kosovo.4 1 A close
reading of the U.N. Charter supports humanitarian intervention
in Kosovo-like situations-that is, in cases in which an outside
alliance acts unilaterally to redress human rights violations
committed by the regime of a third state.42 In such a scenario,
the only legitimate reasons for undertaking humanitarian intervention are linked to affirmative human rights concerns. Further, the means of such intervention must be strictly limited by
humanitarian law. The failure to give due attention to these
justifications and limitations chips away at the legitimacy of
international law.
This Essay is divided into two parts. Part I reads carefully the
provisions of the U.N. Charter in order to set forth the legal
conditions for intervention in Kosovo-like situations. It explains
why the explicit Charter provisions pertaining to lawful use of
force are not likely to be applicable in these cases. Intervention
can be justified instead through reference to other U.N. Charter
provisions that implicitly permit the use of force on limited
grounds. This Essay examines provisions of the Charter largely
overlooked in the humanitarian intervention debate-the "hu40. See, e.g., Report on Harvard Law School Panel Discussion (Apr. 23, 1999), 2
TRANSLX: TRANSNAT'L L. EXCHANGE 5, 5 (Special Supp. May 1999).

41. "Serbia proper" refers to the territory known as Serbia, without the formerly
autonomous provinces of Vojvodinja and Kosovo. "Kosovo" refers to the area that was
an autonomous province of Serbia under the last legal constitution for Yugoslavia,
the Yugoslavia Constitution of 1974.
42. This Essay accepts the definition of humanitarian intervention offered by Professors Franck and Rodley: "The theory of intervention on the ground of humanity is
properly that which recognizes the right of one state to exercise an international
control by military force over the acts of another in regard to its internal sovereignty
when contrary to the laws of humanity." Thomas M. Franck & Nigel S. Rodley,
After Bangladesh: The Law of HumanitarianIntervention by Military Force, 67 AM.
J. INTL L. 275, 277 n.12 (1973). Excluded from this definition, and from this Essay,
are nonmilitary forms of intervention. This Essay also does not discuss humanitarian
intervention for the protection of one's own citizens abroad, even though such intervention would be included in Franck and Rodley's definition. For a discussion of the
latter, see N. RONzITrI, RESCUING NATIONALS ABROAD THROUGH MILITARY COERCION
AND INTERVENTION ON GROUNDS OF HUIANITY (1985).
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man rights provisions"--and suggests a way to add greater legitimacy and coherence to the Charter by reading it as a whole,
thereby relinking human rights to the use of force and sovereignty provisions.
Part II suggests substantive and procedural safeguards on the
ability to use humanitarian intervention to ensure that, far from
being the Pandora's box that critics envisioned,' application of
the doctrine can enhance the legitimacy of international law.
This Essay concludes that in the case of Kosovo, serious questions remain as to whether these safeguards were followed.
I. RECONSIDERING HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
UNDER THE

U.N.

CHARTER

The legal debate over humanitarian intervention in Kosovo
has been posed as a tension between two competing principles:
respect for the "territorial integrity" and "political independence"
of states and the guarantees for human rights and "selfdetermination."" As such, the debate implicates two competing
purposes for the United Nations: ensuring "national sovereignty
and maintenance of peace"" by supporting the status quo political systems and territorial borders,4 6 versus ensuring human

43. See, e.g., H. Scott Fairley, State Actors, HumanitarianIntervention and International Law: Reopening Pandora'sBox, 10 GA. J. INTDL. & COMP. L. 29 (1980) (discussing the current legal validity of humanitarian intervention); David Schweigman,
Humanitarian Intervention Under International Law: The Strife for Humanity, 6
LEIDEN J. INTL L. 91, 99 (1993).

44. See, e.g., Paul Szasz, The Irresistible Force of Self-determination Meets the
Impregnable Fortress of Territorial Integrity: A Cautionary Fairy Tale About the
Clash in Kosovo and Elsewhere, The University of Georgia School of Law, Georgia
Society of International & Comparative Law Banquet (April 8, 1999) (speech on file
with author).
45. See Tom J. Farer, An Inquiry into the Legitimacy of Humanitarian Intervention, in LAW AND FORCE IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER 185, 190 (Lori Fisher

Damrosch & David J. Scheffer eds., 1991) (indicating that, in drafting the U.N.
Charter, human rights ranked below national sovereignty and maintenance of peace).
46. Commentators who argue against humanitarian intervention tend to support
the side of the debate advocating for the prevention of all transboundary uses of
force. See, e.g., IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY
STATES 301 (1963) (stating that forcible intervention is unlawful and explaining that
foreign interests abroad are not always a sufficient reason to intervene); THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 117 (Bruno Simma ed., 1995) [hereinafter CHARTER]; Louis Henkin, The Use of Force: Law and U.S. Policy, in RIGHT V.
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rights protection across and within state borders.4 7 This framing
of the issue, however, obfuscates the real questions at hand. As
this Essay explains, the principles of territorial integrity and
human rights need not conflict; to the contrary, they complement one another. Indeed, "territorial integrity" cannot exist
without human rights, and the realization of human rights can
support the integrity of a territory.48
The central focus for humanitarian intervention thus should
not rest on the issue of "territorial integrity," but instead, should
lie within the parameters set for the "use of force" by international law. As one leading treatise on the U.N. Charter observes,
"[n]either legal writings nor state practice have so far clarified
these terms [of the U.N. Charter pertaining to use of force] beyond doubt."49 At the outset, military action for humanitarian
reasons appears to contradict the U.N. Charter's goal of promoting peaceful dispute settlement. 50 The U.N. Charter is replete
with references to peaceful cooperation in solving problems. For
example, Article 2(3) flatly declares that "[a]ll Members shall
settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a
manner that international peace and security, and justice, are

MIGHT. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 37, 41-42 (Louis Henkin et al.

eds., 2d ed. 1991); Michael Akehurst, HumanitarianIntervention, in INTERVENTION IN
WORLD POLITICS 95, 104-07 (Hedley Bull ed., 1984); Oscar Schachter, The Right of
States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1620, 1628-33 (1984).
47. Commentators who support humanitarian intervention stress the protection of
human rights. See, e.g., ANTHONY D'AIATO, INTERNATIONAL LAW: PROCESS AND PROSPECT 351-52 (1995); FERNANDO R. TES6N, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY
INTO LAW AND MORALITY 173-74 (2d ed. 1997); Richard B. Lillich, Forcible Self-Help
by States to Protect Human Rights, 53 IOWA L. REV. 325, 326-34 (1967); Michael
Reisman, HumanitarianIntervention to Protect the Ibos, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 167, 167-78 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1973).

48. The main opponent to this view, Louis Henkin, counters: "Clearly it was the
original intent of the Charter to forbid the use of force even to promote human
But the use
Human rights are indeed violated in every country ....
rights ....
of force remains itself a most serious-the most serious-violation of human rights."
Henkin, supra note 46, at 61.
49. CHARTER, supra note 46, at 111-12 (footnotes omitted).

50. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 3; id. art. 33, para. 1; id. art. 38; K Venkata
Raman, The Ways of the Peacemaker: A Study of United Nations Intermediary Assis.
tance in the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, in DISPUTE SET1LEMENT THROUGH THE
UNITED NATIONS 367 (K. Venkata Roman ed., 1977).
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not endangered."5 The traditional methods of pacific settlement
in international law are negotiation, inquiry, mediation, and
conciliation.52 Through the use of these methods, international
law encourages the use of any and all peaceful methods to avoid
the use of force.
Of course, peaceful methods do not always work, and therefore it is important to determine when, if ever, there exists any
legal basis for military intervention on humanitarian grounds.
At face value, the words of the U.N. Charter appear to disfavor
intervention, the opponents of which argue that intervention is
susceptible to misuse 53 and that what a state does within its
own borders is largely its own business.' To support their claim,
these anti-interventionists point to the first part of Article 2(4)
of the U.N. Charter, which declares that states "shall refrain in
their international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state ... ."" They also rely heavily on Article 2(7), which states
that [n]othing contained in the present Charter shall authorize

51. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 3.
52. See J.G. MERRILLS, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (3d ed. 1998); see
also U.N. CHARTER arts. 33-38.
53. See Robin A. Cooper, The United Nations Charter and the Use of Force: Is
Article 2(4) Still Workable?, 78 AM. Socy WL L. PROC. 68, 69-70 (remarking on
the possible misuse of intervention as indicated by Domingo E. Acevedo); Barry M.
Benjamin, Note, UnilateralHumanitarianIntervention: Legalizing the Use of Force to
Prevent Human Rights Atrocities, 16 FORDHAM INTL L.J. 120, 147-48 (1992-1993)
("Any individual state action which is permitted, such as self-defense, may result in
potential abuse, but this potential abuse applies to almost every legal rule. Obviously,
not all states that invoke the doctrine of self-defense, a legal right, to justify their
use of force, do so truthfully. The benefits of self-defense, however, legitimize the
doctrine despite the potential abuse of its invocation. The same should be said for
humanitarian intervention."); see also MYRES S. MCDOUGAL & FLORENTINO P.
FELICIANO, LAw AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 416 (1961) (likening a policy of
individual initiative to one of self-defense, both of which are susceptible to abuse);
Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1620,
1638-41 (1984) (explaining collective self-defense and, in particular, American intervention).
54. Contemporary scholars rarely advance this argument so starkly. For a critique
of this notion, see Reisman, supra note 34, at 869 (commenting on the old concept
of "within the domestic jurisdiction of any state").
55. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4. This provision is self-executing because it does
not require a state to do anything; it simply prohibits the commission of certain
acts.
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the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state ...

."6 The general

prohibition on the use of force in Article 2(4) is supported by
language in subsequent General Assembly resolutions.57 Together,
the Charter provisions and subsequent interpretations of the use
of force provisions initially appear to provide nearly an ironclad
prohibition against intervention.
The Charter's prohibition against intervention, however, is not
as strict as it may appear from a cursory reading of these articles. For instance, Articles 2(4) and 2(7) are subject to three
explicit Charter exceptions. In addition, several arguments can
be offered to show that the U.N. Charter permits, and even
mandates, the use of force in limited circumstances. The following section first examines the application of express Charter
provisions to Kosovo-like scenarios and then turns to the

56. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7.
57. The 1965 Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic
Affairs of States and the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty provides
that:
No State has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason
whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. Consequently, armed intervention and all other forms of interference or attempted threats against the personality of the State or against its political,
economic and cultural elements, are condemned.... [Tihe practice of
any form of intervention not only violates the spirit and letter of the
Charter of the United Nations but also leads to the creation of situations
which threaten international peace and security.
G.A . Res. 2131, U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., Supp. No. 14, at 12, U.N. Doc. A/6014
(1965). The General Assembly affirmed this Resolution in the 1970 adoption of the
Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, GA.
Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, Annex at 337, U.N. Doc. A18028
(1970). See Antonio Tanca, The Prohibition of Force in the U.N. Declaration on
Friendly Relations of 1970, in THE CURRENT LEGAL REGULATION OF THE USE OF
FORCE 397 (A. Cassese ed., 1986). The International Court of Justice has not issued
a definitive ruling on the merits of humanitarian intervention in "Kosovo-like situations." Its decisions narrowly construe the right of states to use force on human
rights grounds. See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J.
4, 125 (June 27) ("The Court concludes that the argument derived from the preservation of human rights in Nicaragua cannot afford a legal justification for the conduct of the United States, and cannot in any event be reconciled with the legal
strategy of the respondent State, which is based on the right of collective selfdefence."); Nigel S. Redley, Human Rights and HumanitarianIntervention: The Case
Law of the World Court, 38 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 321, 327-33 (1989).
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Charter's implicit endorsement of intervention in limited circumstances.
A. Lawful Use of Force Expressly Recognized by the U.N.
Charter
The U.N. Charter recognizes three main exceptions to the
prohibition on the use of force. As we will see, however, none of
the exceptions appear to apply to humanitarian intervention in
Kosovo. First, under the U.N. Charter, states may act in selfdefense. Specifically, article 51 of the Charter provides: "Nothing
in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a
Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has
taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace
and security."5 8 The term "inherent right" is significant because
it refers to the customary right of self-defense that predates the
Charter.5 9 This customary right of self-defense, which arguably
includes anticipatory self-defense,60 was not negotiated away
with the signing of the Charter. Thus, "rather than artificially
limiting a State's right of self-defense-it is better to conform to
historically accepted criteria for the lawful use of force-including circumstances that exist outside the 'four corners' of the
Charter."61
Yet, even a broad reading of self-defense is not particularly
instructive with respect to Kosovo. The concept of self-defense
applies only to states; it does not protect individuals against
their own states.6 2 The self-proclaimed Albanian Kosovo has
never been recognized as a state, and the NATO countries un-

58. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
59. See J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 416 (Humphrey Waldock ed., 6th ed.
1963).
60. See, e.g., ROSALYN HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
THROUGH THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 201 (1963); MCDOUGAL &

FELICIANO, supra note 53, at 233-40. For a more restrictive view of self-defense
ruling out anticipatory self-defense, see ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A
DIMED WORLD 230-36 (1986); MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 790 (4th ed.
1997).
61. See OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK 2-4 (1998) (discussing the U.S. Army's views

on self-defense).
62. See MURPHY, supra note 13, at 139.
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dertaking the intervention never were attacked or threatened
with attack. Indeed, the NATO allies never have claimed that
Yugoslavia threatened them with an armed attack. Thus, the
self-defense exception would require an extremely expansive
interpretation to apply to Kosovo.
The related doctrine of "collective self-defense" also would
have to be stretched to apply to Kosovo. As the U.S. Army Operational Law Handbook explains, "to constitute a legitimate act of
collective self-defense, all conditions for the exercise of an individual State's right of self-defense must be met-with the additional requirement that assistance is requested."6 3 The assistance in Kosovo could be seen' as requested by Kosovars, but this
explanation is inadequate because, once again, the Albanian
state of Kosovo is not recognized internationally. The request for
assistance must come from a recognized state or de jure government. This was not the case with respect to the intervention in
Kosovo, and therefore the related doctrine of "collective selfdefense" does not apply.
A second exception to the general ban on the use of force is
Security Council enforcement actions under Chapter VII of the
Charter.65 According to Article 24(1), the Security Council has
"primary responsibility for the maintenance of international
peace and security."66 The Security Council is authorized under
Article 39 to "determine the existence of any threat to the peace,
breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken .... 6 7 The
Council may then "decide what measures not involving the use
of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions."68 If these other measures have not been effective, "it may
take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary

63. OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 61, at 2-5.

64. See id.
65. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7 ("Nothing contained in the present Charter

shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state . . . but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.").
66. Id. art. 24, para. 1.
67. Id. art. 39.
68. Id. art. 41.
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to maintain or restore international peace and security." 9 Further, under Articles 25 and 2(5), all U.N. members are required
"to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council" °
if such decisions are "clear and unequivocal,"7 1 and are prohibited from aiding states with whom "the United Nations is taking
preventive or enforcement action"7 2 respectively.
By definition, the Security Council enforcement actions are
limited by the obvious requirement that the Security Council
act. In the Kosovo conflict, the U.N. Security Council adopted
three main resolutions prior to the NATO bombing. First, in
March 1998, the Council issued Resolution 1160, in which it
imposed an arms embargo on both parties and called upon the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and the leadership of
Kosovo Albanians to enter into meaningful dialogue for a peaceful settlement of internal strife."3 It stated that "failure to make
constructive progress towards the peaceful resolution of the
situation in Kosovo will lead to the consideration of additional
measures."" After the situation deteriorated over the summer,
the Security Council adopted Resolution 1199," 5 which found the
existence of "a threat to peace and security in the region"7 6 and
enjoined the FRY to certain actions, including ceasing "all action
by the security forces affecting the civilian population and order
the withdrawal of security units used for civilian repression. 7
Again, the Security Council warned that "should the concrete
measures demanded in this resolution.., not be taken," it
would "consider further action and additional measures to
maintain or restore peace and stability in the region."7 ' The

69. Id. art. 42.
70. Id. art. 25.
71. See Cooper, supra note 53, at 71 (remarks of Domingo E. Acevedo).
72. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 5.
73. See S.C. Res. 1160, U.N. SCOR, 3868th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1l60
(adopting S.C. Res. 1160), in Resolution 1160 (1998) (last modified June 22,
<http//www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/u980331a.htm>.
74. Id. para. 19.
75. See S.C. Res. 1199, U.N. SCOR, 3930th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1199
(adopting S.C. Res. 1199), in Resolution 1199 (1998) (last modified May 25,
<http:/Awww.nato.int/kosovo/docu/u980923a.htm>.
76. Id.
77. Id. para. 4(a).
78. Id. para. 16.

(1998)
1999)

(1998)
1999)
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concrete measures demanded in the resolution were never fulfilled. Nonetheless, the Security Council failed to consider a
subsequent resolution clearly authorizing the use of force
against the FRY, as it was clear that Russia and China would
veto such a measure.79
After Richard Holbrooke brokered a deal with the FRY for the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to
establish a verifying mission in Kosovo, and NATO reached an
agreement with FRY that would permit it to complement the
OSCE mission with an air verification mission, the Security
Council acted again. In Resolution 1203, adopted on October 24,
1998, it endorsed the OSCE and NATO agreements with FRY,
demanded once more that FRY comply with the conditions set
forth in Resolution 1199, and again affirmed that the situation
in Kosovo posed a threat to ,the peace and security of the region.8" It would be a strain, however, to contend that any Security
Council resolution authorized or approved of the use of force
under any of these resolutions.
In contrast to Kosovo, the Security Council explicitly authorized NATO troops in Bosnia. Security Council Resolution 1031
authorized member states "acting through or in cooperation with
[NATO] ...to establish a multinational implementation force
(IFOR) under unified command and control... .""Such direct

authorization was absent from the Kosovo resolutions. Moreover,
the Kosovo resolutions did not contain the type of indirect language that has been deemed to constitute adequate authorization for the legal use of force. The Security Council did not, as it
did in Resolution 678 with respect to Kuwait, 82 authorize mem-

79. See Simma, supra note 31. As Paul Szasz pointed out, the fact that the Security Council failed to act here cannot be interpreted as a rejection of any particular
course of action: "In a sense, by failing to act it rejected all alternative courses of
action, including full support for lMilosevic." Paul Szasz, Letter from Paul Szasz to
Julie Mertus (July 25, 1999) (on file with author).
80. See S.C. Res. 1203, U.N. SCOR, 3937th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1203 (1998)
(adopting S.C. Res. 1203), in Resolution 1203 (1998) (last modified June 22, 1999)
<http:J/www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/u981024a.htm>.
81. S.C. Res. 1031, U.N. SCOR, 3607th mtg. %14, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1031 (1995),
in Resolution 1031 (1995) (visited Apr. 1, 2000) <http://www.un.orgADocs/scres/
1995/9540526e.htm>.
82. S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 2963d mtg.
2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (1990)
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ber states to use "all necessary means" to enforce previous Security Council resolutions or, as in the case of Resolution 794 for
Somalia,8 3 authorize member states to use "all necessary means
to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations.. . ."4 The language of the Kosovo declarations implied only that the Security Council might authorize
taking "all necessary means" in Kosovo at some stage in the
future. That the Security Council failed to do so supports the
argument that it contemplated, but rejected, such steps, not the
argument that authorization ever materialized.
The argument that the Security Council implicitly authorized
the NATO action in Kosovo ex post also finds little support in
the facts at hand."5 The U.S. State Department attempted to
portray the U.N. and NATO as working in synergy on Kosovo, in
Strobe Talbott's words: "pool[ing] ... energies and strengths on
behalf of an urgent common cause."86 Talbott further claimed
that "the U.N. has lent its political and moral authority to the
Kosovo effort."87 This is an overstatement. Although the Council
in Resolution 1203 expressly welcomed and endorsed NATO involvement in the OSCE verification mission, it did not give a
green light to NATO's subsequent use of force in Kosovo. On the
contrary, Russia and China consistently made clear that they
would not support such actions. "[Iln light of this," Bruno Simma
observed, "the view that the positive reception by the Council of
the results of NATO threats of force could be read as an authorization of such force granted implicitly ex post is untenable."8 8
The interrelatedness of NATO and U.N. actions over Kosovo
prior to the NATO bombing might have indicated some degree of
"synergy," but it did not fulfill the Chapter VII authorization requirement.

(adopting S.C. Res. 678), in Resolution 678 (1990) (visited Apr. 1, 2000) <http'J/www.
un.org/Docs/scres1990/678e.pdf>.
83. S.C. Res. 794, U.N. SCOR, 3145th mtg. 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/794 (1992).
84. Id. para. 10.
85. For a full analysis of all U.N. statements on Kosovo, see Selected Documents
of the United Nations Security Council Concerning Kosovo (FederalRepublic of Yugoslavia) (last modified July 13, 1999) <http://www.un.orgpeacekosovo/sc.kosovo.htm>.
86. Simma, supra note 31, T 35 (quoting U.S. Secretary of State Strobe Talbott).
87. Id.
88. Id.
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After the NATO bombing commenced, the Security Council
had at least two opportunities to approve of the NATO intervention ex post. On May 14, 1999, at the height of the NATO
bombing, the Security Council issued Resolution 1239.89 This
resolution neither supported nor condemned the NATO bombing.
On the contrary, the resolution was drafted carefully, at the
behest of the Russians, so as to not give any ex post facto approval."0 It noted "with interest the intention of the SecretaryGeneral to send a humanitarian needs assessment mission to
Kosovo and other parts of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia"
and reaffirmed the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all
States in the region . ."91 At the conclusion of the NATO campaign, the Council issued Resolution 1244.92 Although this resolution decided "on the deployment in Kosovo, under United
Nations auspices, of international civil and security presences,
with appropriate equipment and personnel as required,""3 it was
wholly prospective in nature. The resolution declined to comment
on previous international intervention in Kosovo. These and
other Council statements fall short of offering ex post approval
of the NATO bombing. Accordingly, the Chapter VII exception to
the use of force cannot be said to apply to Kosovo.
The third explicit exception to the general prohibition on the
use of force, found in Chapter VIII of the Charter, permits actions undertaken by "regional arrangements or agencies for
dealing with matters relating to the maintenance of international
peace and security ..

. ."

Regional arrangements may under-

take any action in this regard that is "consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations." 5 One could argue,

89. S.C. Res. 1239, U.N. SCOR, 4003d mtg., U.N. Doc. SJRES/1239 (1999) (adopting S.C. Res. 1239), in Resolution 1239 (1999) (last modified May, 14 1999) <http'J/
www.un.org/Docs/scres/1999/99sc1239.htm>.
90. The author is indebted to Paul Szasz for this point.
91. S.C. Res. 1239, supra note 89.
92. See S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. SCOR, 4011th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (1999)
(adopting S.C. Res. 1244), in Resolution 1244 (1999) (last modified June 10, 1999)
<http//www.un.org/Docs/scres/1999/99sc1244.htm>.
93. Id. 9J5.
94. U.N. CHARTER art. 52, para. 1.
95. Id.
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as Jordan Paust does, that "NATO is such a regional arrangement and NATO actions in the FRY are consistent with the
serving of peace, security, self-determination, and human
rights.""6 Nonetheless, collective self-defense treaties, such as
the North Atlantic Treaty-the basis for NATO-do not provide
an independent legal basis for the use of force; a legal basis for
engaging in force still must be established from other sources of
international law extrinsic to these treaties. If NATO actions
are deemed to go beyond collective self-defense and are viewed
as "regional enforcement actions" under Chapter VIII, they are
invalid without prior or, in the very least, ex post Security Council authorization.98 Therefore, although regional arrangements
such as NATO hold great promise in promoting peace and justice,99 the Security Council remains the key institution for determining
whether and when enforcement actions are to be carried
10 0
out.
Some commentators contend that, given its essentially "defensive nature,"10 ' NATO is not a "regional organization" capable of
96. Jordan J. Paust, NATO's Use of Force in Yugoslavia, 2 TRANSLEX: TRANSNATL
L. EXCHANGE 3 (Special Supp. May 1999).
97. See OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 61, at 2-5.
98. See U.N. CHARTER art. 53, para. 1.
99. See, e.g., John Norton Moore, The Role of Regional Arrangements in the Maintenance of World Order, in THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER: CONFLICT MANAGEMENT 122, 124 (Cyril E. Black & Richard A. Falk eds., 1971); Burns
H. Weston et al., Regional Human Rights Regimes: A Comparison and Appraisal, 20
VAND. J. TRANSNATL L. 585 (1987).
100. Jordan Paust argues that NATO action was not impermissible under Article
53 of the Charter because the Security Council was veto-deadlocked with respect to
its ability to make decisions on enforcement actions. He explains that "[wihen the
Council is veto-deadlocked, it is unable to decide on measures 'to give effect to its
decisions' (within Articles 41-42) or to decide on 'action required to carry out' its
decisions (within Article 48)." Paust, supra note 96, at 3. Paust also contends that
by majority vote, the Security Council should be able to provide authorization for regional action "even though, or especially because, such action is not 'enforcement
action under its authority.'" Id. This author declines to adopt either of these arguments, finding the argument under Article 106 of the U.N. Charter more persuasive.
101. See MURPHY, supra note 13, at 340 ("The North Atlantic Treaty Alliance, however, is structured as only a defensive alliance and has not been regarded by its
members as a regional agency under Chapter VII.") NATO's self-conception, however,
has been changing. See Ivo H. Daalder, Brookings Institution, NATO, the UN, and
the Use of Force (last modified Mar. 1999) <http'/lwww.unausa.org/issues/sc
/daalder.htm>.
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undertaking "enforcement actions" under Chapter VIII. 1 2 Under
this argument, the requirement of Security Council authorization would still apply, but the requirement itself would be based
not on Chapter VIII, but on Chapter VII of the Charter. The
distinction is without consequence in the case of the NATO action in Kosovo. Because the Security Council gave neither an
express nor an implied ex post authorization for the action, the
NATO action in Kosovo cannot be said to fall within either the
Chapter VII or Chapter VIII exceptions. 3
B. Lawful Use of Force Implicitly Permitted Under the U.N.
Charter
Although it would be a stretch to argue that the express provisions of the U.N. Charter permitting force apply to Kosovo, at
least four interrelated arguments can be made that the U.N.
Charter implicitly permits, or even mandates, the use of force in
the case of Kosovo.
1. Use of Force as Not Violating "Territorial Integrity" or
"PoliticalIndependence"
By its very terms, the Charter does not prohibit all threats or
uses of force; the kind of force and intervention 1' it does prohibit
is inapplicable to the Kosovo scenario. Article 2(4) prohibits force
against the "territorial integrity or political independence of any
state ..... ,0 5 Under the traditional concept of sovereignty, "even
scrutiny of international human rights without the permission of
the sovereign could arguably constitute a violation of sovereignty
by its 'invasion' of the sovereign's domaine resgrvd."10 6 Embracing
this traditional concept of sovereignty, however, requires accep102. See, e.g., Simma, supra note 31.
103. See supra notes 89-100 and accompanying text.
104. This Essay speaks alternatively of "use of force" and "intervention," using the
common understanding of "use of force" as one form of intervention. This is not to
assert that "use of force" and "intervention" are identical under the U.N. Charter.
The U.N. Charter refers to "threat or use of force" by states in Article 2.4 and "intervention" prohibited to the United Nations in Article 2.7. See U.N. CHARTER arts.
2.4, 2.7.
105. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
106. Reisman, supra note 34, at 869.
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tance of a limited conception of sovereignty that renders superfluous modern developments in international law concerning the
interpretation of the core purposes of the U.N. Charter. The
modern doctrine of human rights, which restricts the ability of
states to mistreat its own citizens, would be equally impermissible under the traditional concept of sovereignty. Any intervention by outside states that would restrict the sovereign's ability
to do as it pleases would come in direct conflict with this conception of sovereignty and, thus, would constitute unlawful intervention. This strict definition of sovereignty contradicts the
modern understandings of both sovereignty and "territorial integrity."
One modern understanding of sovereignty refers not only to
state borders, but also to political sovereignty-that is, to the
ability of people within those borders to affect choices regarding
how they should be governed and by whom. 1 17 Those who threaten
that ability, be they internal or external in origin, violate the
sovereignty of the people.'0 8 Accordingly, when another state
intervenes to protect human rights in such circumstances, it is
not violating a principle of sovereignty. Rather, it is liberating a
principle of sovereignty.' This kind of intervention, which could
be termed "self-determination assistance,""' finds support in the
numerous international instruments that recognize a right to
self-determination, including Articles 1 and 55 of the U.N. Charter."' The 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law

107. See id. at 868-69.
108. See, e.g., Allan Rosas, Internal Self-Determination, in MODERN LAW OF SELFDETERMINATION 225, 225-52 (Christian Tomuschat ed., 1993) (examining the distinc-

tion between external and internal self-determination).
109. Reisman, supra note 34, at 872.
110. Paust, supra note 96, at 3.
111. Article 1(2) states that the basic purpose of the U.N. is "[to develop friendly
relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and selfdetermination of peoples...." U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 2. Article 55 ties the

principle of self-determination to respect for human rights. See id. art. 55. The principle of self-determination is also found in the International Covenant on Economic,
Social & Cultural Rights, GA. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16,
Annex at 49, U.N. Doc. A16316 (1967): "All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely
pursue economic, social, and cultural development." U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 1; see
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, GA. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR,
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Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in
Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations observes
that "[e]very State has the duty to refrain from any forcible
action which deprives peoples.., of their right to self-determination" and that "[i]n their actions against, and resistance to,
such forcible action in pursuit of the exercise of their right to
self-determination, such peoples are entitled to seek and to receive support in accordance with the purposes and principles of
the Charter." 2 Under this theory, intervention in Kosovo was
permissible because it was designed to support the sovereignty
rights of the peoples of Kosovo.
Another modern understanding of sovereignty maintains a
focus on state borders, but stresses the various ways in which
recent globalization has eroded the classical definition of sovereignty,"1 thereby widening the parameters of permissible use of
21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, Annex at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); The Declaration on
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation
Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res.
2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 123, U.N. Doc. A18028 (1971) ("[A]ll
peoples have the right freely to determine, without external interference, their political status and to pursue their economic, social and cultural development, and every
State has the duty to respect this right in accordance with the provisions of the
Charter."). For an exhaustive collection of documents related to self-determination,
see DOCUMENTS ON AUTONOMY AND MINORY RIGHTS (Hurst Hannum ed., 1993).
Commentary on self-determination is extensive. See, e.g., LEE C. BUCHHEIr,
SECESSION: THE LEGITIMACY OF SELF-DETERMINATION (1978); HAROLD S. JOHNSON,
SELF-DETERMINATION WITHIN THE COMMUNITY OF NATIONS (1967), W. OFUATEYKODJOE, THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1977);
MODERN LAW OF SELF-DETERMINATION, supra note 108; THOMAS D. MUSGRAVE, SELFDETERMINATION AND NATIONAL MINORITIES (1997); NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION
AND SECESSION (Margaret Moore ed., 1998); MICHLA POMERANCE, SELF-DETERMINATION IN LAW AND PRACTICE (1982); DOV RONEN, THE QUESTION FOR SELF-DETERMINATION (1979); SELF-DETERMINATION AND SELF-ADMINISTRATION: A SOURCEBOOK
(Wolfgang Danspeckgruber & Arthur Watts eds., 1997) [hereinafter SOURCEBOOK];
Yoram Dinstein, Collective Human Rights of Peoples and Minorities, 25 INTL & COM.
L.Q. 102 (1976); Rupert Emerson, Self-Determination, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 459 (1971);
T.M. Franck, Postmodern Tribalism and the Right to Secession, in PEOPLES AND MINORms IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (Catherine Brtlmann et al. eds., 1993); Lung-chu
Chen, Self Determination as a Human Right, in TOWARD WORLD ORDER AND HUMAN
DIGNITY 198 (W. Michael Reisman & Burns H. Weston eds., 1976); Ved P. Nanda,
Self-Determination Under International Law: Validity of Claims to Secede, 13 CASE
W. RES. J. INVL L. 257 (1981).
112. G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, Annex at 123, U.N.
Doc. A/8028 (1971).
113. See generally BETWEEN SOVEREIGNTY AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: THE UNITED
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force under the doctrine of humanitarian intervention.11 Globalization is marked by two interrelated tendencies: the restructuring of the world economy on a regional and global scale through
the agency of the transnational corporation and financial markets from above, and the rise of transnational social forces and
transboundary networks 115 concerned with environmental protec116
tion, human rights, and peace and human security from below.
Numerous international institutions now exist to restrict the
"operational sovereignty"-that is, a state's practical sovereignty,
rather than its legal sovereignty-of states, including the Inter-7
national Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organization."1

NATIONS, THE STATE AND CIVIL SOCIETY (Albert J. Paolini et al. eds., 1998) (discussing changes in sovereignty in the post Cold War era, and the United Nations' ability
to deal with them); JOSEPH A. CAMiLERI & JIM FALK, THE END OF SOVEREIGNTY?
THE POLITICS OF A SHRINKING AND FRAGMENTING WORLD (1992) (examining the
impact of economic, technological, and institutional changes in sovereignty).
114. See Nancy D. Arnison, InternationalLaw and Non-Intervention: When Do Humanitarian Concerns Supersede Sovereignty?, 17 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 199, 20304 (1993).
115. See Patricia Chilton, Mechanics of Change: Social Movements, Transnational
Coalitions, and the TransformationProcesses in Eastern Europe, in BRINGING TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS BACK IN: NON-STATE ACTORS, DOMESTIC STRUCTURES AND INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 189, 225 (Thomas Risse-Kappen ed., 1995) (explaining
how "[t]ransnationalism takes account of coalitions of non-state actors across national
borders"); Ronald Inglehardt, Modernization and Postmoderization:Cultural, Economic
and Political Change, in 43 SOCIETIES 188, 188-90 (1997) (discussing the importance
of organizational networks); Timothy W. Luke, New World Order or Neo-World Orders: Power, Politics and Ideology in Informationalizing Glocalities, in GLOBAL
MODERNITIES 91 (Mike Featherstone et al. eds., 1995) (discussing emerging local/global "webs"); Victor Perez-Diaz, The Possibility of Civil Society: Traditions,
Character and Challenges, in CIVIL SOCIETY: THEORY, HISTORY, COMPARISON 80, 90
(John A. Hall ed., 1995) (noting emerging economic, social, and informational networks); Sol Picciotto, Networks in International Economic Integration: Fragmented
States and the Dilemmas of Neo-Liberalism, 17 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 1014, 103550 (1996-1997) (discussing networks in international economic systems contributing to
fragmentation). For an excellent case study of the impact of international networks
on global politics in the context of the nuclear freeze campaign, see COALITIONS &
POLITICAL MOVEMENTS: THE LESSONS OF THE NUCLEAR FREEZE (Thomas R. Rochon
& David S. Meyer eds., 1997).
116. See Julie Mertus, From Legal Transplants to Transformative Justice: Human
Rights and the Promise of Transnational Civil Society, 14 AM. U. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 1335, 1341-87 (1999); Richard A. Falk, The Right of Self-Determination Under
InternationalLaw: The Coherence of Doctrine Versus the Incoherence of Experience, in
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 111, at 335.
117. See RICHARD FALK, LAW IN AN EMERGING GLOBAL VILLAGE: A POST-
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Moreover, a growing number of international bodies now exist to
restrict the "legal sovereignty" of states, such as the International
Court of Justice, the International Criminal Court, and the various treaty-monitoring mechanisms of the U.N." 8
In today's geopolitical climate, what happens to citizens inside
particular state borders has become the business of other states
and strict notions of sovereignty have begun to erode concomitantly.1 19 The efforts of nongovernmental and governmental organizations to provide humanitarian assistance and protection
in the face of government opposition has also served to circumvent state sovereignty. 121 Similarly, the new roles played by
NATO, OSCE, and other international arrangements in response
to the Kosovo crisis can be characterized as further evidence of
this erosion in state sovereignty.1'2 Binaifer Nowrojee noted that
the slow, but evident, waning of an absolute position on sovereignty "is leading to an emerging right, and perhaps even duty,
for states to intervene on humanitarian grounds." 2
The modern understanding of territorial integrity also supports
humanitarian intervention. As interpreted in treaties and diplomatic history, territorial integrity refers not to the territory of a
state, but to the integrity of the territory.' An essential condition of this integrity is the maintenance of certain standards of
administration on the territory, including the protection of funda-

WESTPHALmN PERSPECTIVE 60 (1998).
118. See generally THEODORE MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS LAW-MAKING IN THE UNITED
NATIONS: A CRITIQUE OF INSTRUMENTS AND PROCESS (1986) (addressing some of the
major human rights instruments and assessing the organs enforcing them).
119. See Binaifer Nowrojee, Recent Development, Joining Forces: United Nations
and Regional Peacekeeping-Lessonsfrom Liberia, 8 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 129, 129-30
(1995).
120. See Arnison, supra note 114, at 203-04.
121. Another view of sovereignty holds that its position is largely untenable for logical reasons. By definition, a sovereign power should be the supreme power, and in

that sense it should operate vertically. If all states are to be considered sovereign
powers, however, then the logic falters, for not one state will be the supreme, at

least not in any legal sense. In this manner, it may be inevitable that the concept
of sovereignty be eclipsed, because the nature of our global society is more horizon-

tal than vertical. See Jarat Chopra & Thomas G. Weiss, Sovereignty Is No Longer
Sacrosanct: Codifying Humanitarian Intervention, 6 ETHICS & INTIL AFF. 95, 106
(1992).
122. See Nowrojee, supra note 119, at 129.
123. See D'AMATO, supra note 47, at 56-72.

1768

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:1743

mental human rights norms. Forfeiture of that duty of maintenance opens the door for intervention." Humanitarian intervention in such a case falls below the threshold set in Article 2(4)
because the intervenors do not seek to deprive the state of its
integrity; instead, they seek to enhance it."2 5 Intervention in cases
like Kosovo may result in a loss of state control over some of its
territory, but the loss of control is the result of the underlying
gross and systemic human rights abuses, and not the result of an
intervention designed "against territorial integrity.1 6
Alternatively, intervention could be justified on a waiver theory.
Under this theory, governments that commit violations of human rights are said to waive any claims to the protections normally offered by sovereignty against intervention by others because sovereignty is contingent upon compliance with international legal obligations. 127 According to Fernando Tes6n: "We
have created the institution of state sovereignty to provide a
shield for groups of individuals to organize themselves freely in
political communities.... When human rights are instead violated, delinquent governments forfeit the protection afforded by
article 2(4). "128 The waiver theory would permit humanitarian
intervention in situations where states admittedly have violated
Article 2(4).

124. A somewhat more extreme view is that governments who abuse the human
rights of their citizens are in fact criminal in nature. Just as criminals lose their
right to participate in the self-determination of their state, so does a government.
Consequently, if a government can be viewed as criminal, it then becomes permissible
for other states to take on the role of "policemen" and to act to end the violations of
human rights. See Michael J. Smith, HumanitarianIntervention: An Overview of the
Ethical Issues, in ETHICS AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 271, 286 (Joel H. Rosenthal
ed., 2d ed. 1999) (drawing heavily upon MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS

(1977)).
125. See MURPHY, supra note 13, at 71 (paraphrasing, but not agreeing with, Michael Reisman's argument in HumanitarianIntervention to Protect the Ibos, supra
note 47, at 177). But see Brownlie, infra note 179 (arguing from a review of travaux
preparatories for the U.N. Charter that the phrase "territorial integrity" was added
to the Charter).
126. See TES6N, supra note 47 at 173.
127. See W. MICHAEL REISMAN, NULLITY AND REVISION 666-67 (1971); see also
Mitchell A. Meyers, Note, A Defense of Unilateral or Multi-Lateral Intervention Where
a Violation of International Human Rights Law by a State Constitutes an Implied
Waiver of Sovereignty, 3 ILSA J. INTL & COMP. L. 895, 901-07 (1997), available in
WESTLAW, ILSAJICL File.
128. TES6N, supra note 47, at 174.
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It is paradoxical that the Milosevic *government, which flagrantly disregarded the sovereignty of the internationally recognized states of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, is now claiming
its sovereign rights. 9 A regime built and sustained by intense
human rights violations, such as the one led by Slobodan
Milosevic in Belgrade, is not entitled to make claims of territorial
integrity. Any state like Serbia "that is oppressive and violates
the autonomy and integrity of its subjects forfeits its moral
claim to full sovereignty." 130 Indeed, the Milosevic regime abrogated its own claims to territorial independence once it illegally
deprived Kosovo of its autonomous statutes in 1989 and began
its campaign of repression. 3 '
Additionally, the Milosevic-led regime cannot assert with
authority the claim that NATO intervention violates its political
independence."3 Intervention in violation of political independence refers-in Richard Lillich's terms-to "those coercive measures designed to maintain or alter the political situation in
another state." 33 With respect to Kosovo, Anthony D'Amato has
observed that "[the NATO bombing [was] not directed against
the political independence of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(clause 2 [of Article 2(4)], for there [was] no attempt to takeover
its government; indeed, NATO [kept] trying to negotiate with its
government."" While the FRY is likely to lose control over all or
part of Kosovo, this will be the result of its own human rights
was directed
violations and not because the NATO intervention
3
against the political independence of FRY.'1

129. Letter from Branka Magas to Julie Mertus (Apr. 19, 1999) (on file with the
William & Mary Law Review).
130. Smith, supra note 124, at 289.
131. See JULiE A. MERTUS, KoSOvo: How MYTHs AND TRuTHs STARTED A WAR
(1999).
132. See Richard Falk, Comments, 68 AM. SoC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 192, 196-97 (1975)
("For the most fundamental postulate underlying the state system is the notion that
one does not try to control political developments in foreign societies.").
133. Richard B. Lillich, Intervention to Protect Human Rights, 15 MCGILL L.J. 205,
209 (1969). But see CHARTER, supra note 46, at 117 ("[A]n incursion into the territory
of another state constitutes an infringement of Art. 2(4), even if it is not intended to
").
deprive that state of part of its territory ..
134. Anthony D'Amato, International Law and Kosovo, 2 TRANSLFX TRANSNATL L.
EXCHANGE 1, 1 (Special Supp. May 1999).
135. Jordan Paust has made a similar argument. See Paust, supra note 95, at 3.
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2. Intervention Consistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations
The U.N. Charter advances central principles that could not
be protected in Kosovo without intervention. It is the principles
of the Charter and not merely the letters of its provisions to
which states should endeavor to conform."3 6 As Article 2(4)
states, members of the United Nations are prohibited from acting "in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the
United Nations."3 7 It would seem, therefore, that interventions
consistent "with the Purposes of the United Nations" are permitted. IS8
The central purposes of the U.N. are set forth in Article 1 of
the U.N. Charter. Humanitarian intervention in the case of
Kosovo furthers perhaps the most central purpose of the organization-namely, the maintenance of international peace and
security.' Indeed, international peace and security must mean
more than the absence of an internationally recognized war;
human rights violations short of all-out war also constitute major breaches of peace and security."' In situations such as
Kosovo, peace and security cannot be said to exist so long as the
state is free to commit gross and systemic human rights abuses
against its own people.
Other central purposes of the United Nations, also noted in
Article 1 of the Charter, include developing "respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples"' and
"encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or
religion .... ,4 These articles appear to confirm the view that
136. See W. Michael Reisman, Criteriafor the Lawful Use of Force in International
Law, 10 YALE J. INTL L. 279, 283-85 (1985).
137. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
138. Id.
139. See id. art. 1, para. 1.
140. The U.N. Security Council has recognized that "non-military sources of instability in the economic, social, humanitarian and ecological fields have become threats
to peace and security." U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3046th mtg. at 143, U.N. Doc.
S/PV.3046 (1992).
141. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 2.
142. Id. art. 1, para. 3; see also id. art. 55(c) (stating that the U.N. shall promote

"universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms

2000]

LESSONS FROM KOSOVO

1771

people are rights-bearing entities and therefore it is appropriate
that states are the vehicles that should be held accountable for
the protection of those rights.1' The prohibition on the use of
force in Article 2(4) does not rule out intervention designed to
promote these goals. Where, as in Kosovo, a government flouts
respect for the principles of equal rights and self-determination,
and violates the most basic human rights and fundamental freedoms of individuals, intervention may be the only way to ensure
that the central goals of the United Nations are upheld.
3. Intervention Mandated Under Human Rights Provisions

A related argument contends that the U.N. Charter not only
permits intervention on humanitarian grounds, it requires it in
cases of gross and systemic human rights abuses.' Articles 55
and 56 of the U.N. Charter implore "[aill Members [to] pledge
themselves to take joint.., action in cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of... universal respect for, and
observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for
all...."'4 5 As a first step, in 1948 the General Assembly approved the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which declares that "recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal
and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the
foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world."1' Since

for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion).
143. See Louis B. Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of
Individuals Rather than States, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 12 (1982). See generally LouIs
B. SOHN & THOMAS BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
(1973) (collecting many of the primary documents governing human rights, as well
as materials analyzing the same).
144. Commentators supporting this view include: D'AMATO, supra note 47 at 39;
TES6N, supra note 47; Michael J. Bazyler, Reexamining the Doctrine of Humanitarian
Intervention in Light of the Atrocities in Kampuchea and Ethiopia, 23 STAN. J. INT'L
L. 547 (1987); Michael J. Levitin, The Law of Force and the Force of Law: Grenada,
the Falklands, and HumanitarianIntervention, 27 HARV. INT'L L.J. 621 (1986); Richard B. Lillich, HumanitarianIntervention: A Reply to Ian Brownlie and a Plea for
Constructive Alternatives, in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 229, 23132 (John Norton Moore ed., 1974); Lillich, supra note 132; Myres S. McDougal & W.
Michael Reisman, Response by Professors McDougal and Reisman, 3 INTL LAW. 438
(1969).
145. U.N. CHARTER arts. 55(c), 56.
146. GA- Res. 217(A)(IM), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., preamble, at 71 (1948).
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that date, the General Assembly and other regional and international bodies have adopted a host of human rights instruments.'47 As Louis Sohn has argued, these instruments represent an authoritative interpretation of the U.N. Charter's
human rights provisions. 48
As human rights have gained acceptance, the notion of state
sovereignty has lost further ground.'48 The internationalization
of human rights suggests that the treatment of citizens within a
state is a subject of international concern and no longer a matter
of exclusive domestic jurisdiction. 50 In other words, the international community has an interest in the protection of human
rights of all people, regardless of state borders. Article 2(7) of
the U.N. Charter, which prohibits intervention in the internal
affairs of a state, thus cannot be said to apply to human rights
violations.'' Where, as in Kosovo, a state is incapable of protect-

147. Some of the most important human rights instruments include: Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249
U.N.T.S. 13; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec.
16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3; International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Racial Discrimination, Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277
[hereinafter Genocide Convention]; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, GAL Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th
Sess., Annex at 197. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS: SIXTY MAJOR GLOBAL INSTRUMENTS (Winston E. Langley ed., 1992) (collecting global, rather than regional, human
rights instruments).
At the 1993 U.N. World Conference on Human Rights, representatives of 171
states recognized that the human rights embodied in the U.N. Charter and in other
international instruments were "beyond question." United Nations World Conference
on Human Rights: Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, ch. 1, para. 1, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.157/24 (1993), 32 I.L.M. 1661, 1664 (1993).
148. See Sohn, supra note 143, at 8.
149. See Anne Bodley, Weakening the Principle of Sovereignty in InternationalLaw:
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 31 N.Y.U. J. INVL
L. & POL. 417 (1999); Byron F. Burmester, On HumanitarianIntervention: The New
World Order and Wars to Preserve Human Rights, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 269, 279.
150. See SOHN & BUERGENTHAL, supra note 143, at 587-93, 672-89 (discussing the
origin of domestic jurisdiction, as well as the need to intervene in matters that are
traditionally within a state's domestic jurisdiction).
151. Cf. Burns H. Weston, Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY: ISSUES AND ACTION 14, 17-21 (Richard Pierre Claude & Burns H. Weston
eds., 2d ed. 1992) (examining the definition of human rights and arguing that the
U.N. charter is not clear about how human rights are to be viewed and protected).
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ing human rights or is itself the perpetrator, humanitarian intervention may be the only solution.
The right to life, which is included in all main human rights
instruments, includes the right to emergency assistance and to
protection from gross and systemic human rights abuses. 52 The
trend in recent years has been toward the development and
improvement of human rights monitoring and enforcement
mechanisms.15 If the target state is a party to any of the relevant human rights conventions, or if the human right can be
said to be customary international law applicable to all states,
humanitarian intervention can be grounded or categorized as a
means of enforcing these obligations on behalf of the victims."

Matters concerning genocide, 55 crimes against humanity,156 and

152. See generally JAIME ORAA, HUMAN RIGHTS IN STATES OF EMERGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1992) (reexamining the emergent principles governing these human
rights and the governing multilateral treaties).
153. See Elsa Stamatopoulou, The Development of United Nations Mechanisms for the
Protection and Promotion of Human Rights, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 687, (1998).
154. This point, like many in this Essay, is not free from controversy. This suggests that individuals are third parties possessing rights under human rights treaties, thereby warranting state action for violations.
155. See Genocide Convention, supra note 147. The Genocide Convention, Article H
defines genocide as:
[Aicts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national,
ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
1. Killing members of the group;
2. Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
3. Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
4. Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
5. Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
Id. art. II; see LEO KUPER, GENOCIDE: ITS POLITICAL USE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 19-56 (1981).
156. Crimes against humanity are defined as:
[Miurder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane
acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the war,
or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or
in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal,
whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where
perpetrated.
Charter of the International Military Tribunal (IMT), in Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of European Axis (London Agreement),
Aug. 8, 1945, 3 U.S.T. 1242 (footnotes omitted); see also Beth Van Schaack, The
Definition of Crimes Against Humanity: Resolving the Incoherence, 37 COLUM. J.
TRANSNATL L. 787 (1999) (examining the evolution of the crimes against humanity
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certain war crimes 157 are subject to universal jurisdiction and
responsibility. 1 58 In the case of Kosovo, leaving the question of
genocide to one side,'59 intervention was warranted due to the
egregious violations of human rights, which posed a threat to
international peace and security, 6 ' and the rapid and overwhelming forced displacement of Kosovars,
which also raised
61
concern.'
international
grave
of
matters
The human rights grounds for intervention are particularly
strong where the group targeted for human rights violations is
singled out because of its "race, sex, language or religion"-the
groups explicitly mentioned in the U.N. Charter and reaffirmed
as especially suspect classifications in other international instruments.162 The gross and systemic human rights abuses in Kosovo

concept).
157. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug.
12, 1949, arts. 1, 3, 13-16, 23-24, 6 U.S.T. 3316 (applying to attacks on and treatment of both internationals and co-nationals); Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, arts. 146-47, 6 U.S.T.
3516.
158. See Henry T. King & Theodore C. Theofrastous, From Nuremberg to Rome: A
Step Backward for U.S. Foreign Policy, 31 CASE W. RES. J. INTL L. 47, 53-54
(1999).
159. Kofi Annan, the U.N. Secretary-General, found evidence supporting the claim
that genocide was being committed in Kosovo. According to Annan, "[t]he vicious and
systematic campaign of 'ethnic cleansing' conducted by the Serbian authorities in
Kosovo appears to have one aim: to expel or kill as many ethnic Albanians in
Kosovo as possible, thereby denying a people of their most basic rights to life, liberty
and security." Press Release, SG/SM16949 HR/CN/898, Secretary-General Calls for
Renewed Commitment in New Century to Protect Rights of Man, Woman,
Child-Regardless of Ethnic, National Belonging (last modified Apr. 7, 1999) <http'//
www.un.org/News/Press> (type SG/SM16949 in the press release number field) (presenting Kofi Annan, Address to the Commission on Human Rights (Apr. 7, 1999)).
For the argument that genocide was occurring in Kosovo, see Holly Burkhalter,
Physicians for Human Rights, Statement on Genocide in Kosovo (last modified Apr.
8, 1999) <http://www.phrusa.org/new/gen.html>.
160. See U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3046th mtg. at 143, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3046 (1992)
(recognizing nonmilitary threats to peace).
161. The U.N. Secretary-General recognized in his "Agenda for Peace" that refugee
flows and other forced displacement and massive migrations are "both sources and
consequences of conflict that require the ceaseless attention and the highest priority
in the efforts of the United Nations." An Agenda for Peace: Preventative Diplomacy,
Peacemaking and Peacekeeping, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Agenda Item 10,
13, U.N.
Doc. A/47/277, S/24111 (1992).
162. See supra note 147 (citing Conventions); see also Laura A. Donner, Gender
Bias in Drafting International Discrimination Conventions: The 1979 Women's Con-
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were at their core stridently racist acts. They were made possible because of dehumanization of the "other"-racism of the
purest sort.16 Under such circumstances, intervention was par-

ticularly warranted."
4. Intervention as a Stopgap Measure

Another strong argument supporting NATO action in Kosovo
rests on the U.N.'s own failure to act. If the United Nations
were functioning as it was intended, unilateral intervention
would be unnecessary. Yet, because the U.N. system has failed
to function properly as a collective body addressing human
rights and other security concerns, states retain the right to act
unilaterally.'6 5 The basic idea behind this argument-which Wil

vention Compared with the 1965 Racial Convention, 24 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 241, 248
(1994) (defining racial and gender discrimination).
163. See Julie Mertus, Racism in Civil Conflict: Domestic and Global Dimensions
(Joseph Pearlcovich & Michael Likosley, eds., Oxford Univ. Press forthcoming 2000).
164. The human rights mandate for intervention not only has strong legal foundations, it is grounded in moral considerations as well. Fernando Tes6n has proposed
that the protection and enforcement of the natural rights of its citizens is the ultimate justification for the existence of a state. See TES6N, supra note 47, at 15-17;
see also Richard B. Lillich, Kant and the Current Debate over HumanitarianIntervention, 6 J. TRMASNAT'L L. & POLY 397 (1997) (discussing classical western notions
of intervention, morality, and sovereignty).
165. See Reisman, supra note 136, at 279 (discussing the role of state coercion in
light of the U.N.'s failure as a security institution). The extent to which the U.N.
Charter affected the doctrine of humanitarian intervention that existed prior to its
adoption is the subject of a more expanded analysis. For centuries, sovereigns have
claimed a right to intervene in the affairs of another state if its subjects were being
grossly mistreated. See Jean-Pierre L. Fonteyne, The Customary International Law
Doctrine of HumanitarianIntervention: Its Current Validity Under the U.N. Charter,
4 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 203, 214-26 (1974). Considerable debate also exists over the
acceptance of the doctrine of unilateral humanitarian intervention during the drafting of the U.N. Charter, and the impact of the Charter on that doctrine. Compare
Lillich, supra note 144, at 210-11 (arguing that the doctrine of humanitarian intervention was clearly establisl!ed under customary international law, but was supplanted
by the U.N. Charter), with W.D. Verwey, Humanitarian Intervention Under International Law, 32 NETH. INTL L. REV. 357, 376-77 (1985) (questioning whether
humanitarian intervention was ever recognized in preexisting international law).
Professor Lauterpacht is conflicted as to whether the doctrine of humanitarian intervention has ever become part of customary international law. Compare 1 L.
OPPENHEIM, INWERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 312 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955)
("There is general agreement that, by virtue of its personal and territorial supremacy,
a State can treat its own nationals according to discretion. But there is a substan-
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Verwey has termed the "link theory"-is that U.N. member
states were prepared "to accept an absolute obligation to refrain
from unilateral resort to armed force on condition and presupposing that the United Nations would effectively safeguard international peace and security."'66 The United Nations, however,
never proved to be up to the task.
Institutions and mechanisms that would have warranted a
state's relinquishment of its traditional rights were never established. 167 Article 43 of the Charter envisioned a system wherein
states would make available to the Security Council, "on its call
and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements,
armed forces, assistance, and facilities... necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security."168 These
agreements were to be "negotiated as soon as possible on the
initiative of the Security Council." 169 Negotiations were effectively abandoned, however, by 1950.170
Article 106 of the Charter envisioned the creation of transitional security arrangements whereby signatories to the Charter
could undertake joint action to maintain peace and security as
stopgap measures until the signing of Article 43 agreements. 171
As Sean Murphy notes, "while such action was authorized only

tial body of opinion and of practice in support of the view that there are limits to
that discretion and that when a State renders itself guilty of cruelties against and
persecution of its nationals in such a way as to deny their fundamental human
rights and to shock the conscience of mankind, intervention in the interest of humanity is legally permissible." (footnotes omitted)), with H. Lauterpacht, The Grotian
Tradition in InternationalLaw, 23 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 46 (1946) ("The doctrine of
humanitarian intervention has never become a fully acknowledged part of positive
international law.").
166. Wil D. Verwey, HumanitarianIntervention in the 1990s and Beyond: An International Law Perspective, in WORLD ORDERS IN THE MAKING: HUMANITARIAN INTER-

VENTION AND BEYOND 180, 194 (Jan Nederveen Pieterse ed., 1998).
167. See Richard B. Lillich, Forcible Self-Help Under InternationalLaw, 22 NAVAL
WAR C. REV. 56, 62 (1970) (reevaluating the U.N. Charter's prohibition on the use of
force in the absence of collective security mechanisms 25 years after the Charter's
adoption). But see Lillich, supra note 164, at 400 (noting the significant precedents
for U.N.-authorized humanitarian intervention set in the 1990s).
168. U.N. CHARTER art. 43, para. 1.
169. Id. art. 43, para. 3.
170. See LELAND M. GOODRICH ET AL., CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: COhIMENTARY AND DOcUMENTS 317-26 (3d rev. ed. 1969).
171. See U.N. CHARTER art. 106.
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during a transition period to allow for the conclusion of Article

43 agreements, that transition period has not yet ended." 7 2 Accordingly, intervention in disputes such as Kosovo can be viewed
as legitimate Article 106 collective actions undertaken only out
of necessity because of failures by the United Nations.' 73
The argument that state intervention is necessary because of
the failures of the United Nations is supported by precedent. Enforcement actions by the Security Council historically have been
hindered by the permanent member veto power.'74 To circumvent this problem during the Korean crisis in 1950, however, the
General Assembly exercised its own powers reserved under Articles 10, 11 and 14 to address "general principles of cooperation
in the maintenance of international peace and security"7 5 and to
"recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any
situation."'76 Specifically, the General Assembly adopted the
Charter by the Uniting for Peace Resolution, which provides:
If the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the
permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security
in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace,
breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to
making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures. These recommendations can include in the
case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression the use of
armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and security. 77

172. MURPHY, supra note 13, at 81.
173. Julius Stone has made a similar argument. See JULIUS STONE, AGGRESSION
AND WORLD ORDER: A CRITIQUE OF UNITED NATIONS THEORIES OF AGGRESSION 94-98
(1958). On the contrary, Paul Szasz has argued that when the Security Council
becomes paralyzed, "human rights are subordinated to the obligations to keep the
peace." Discussion, in THE UNITED NATIONS: A REASSESSMENT SANCTIONS, PEACEKEEPiNG, AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE 142, 144-45 (John M. Paxman & George T.

Boggs eds., 1973) (printing commentary by Mr. Paul Szasz of the Legal Office of the
United Nations).
174. See Reisman, supra note 136, at 280.
175. U.N. CHARTER art. 11, para. 1.
176. U.N. CHARTER art. 14; see U.N. GAOR 1st Comm., 5th Sess., Annex, Agenda
Item 68, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/1377 (1950).
177. G.A. Res. 377, U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 20, at 10, U.N. Doc. A11775
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The General Assembly has in fact acted in this manner on
several occasions. 178 The argument for intervention in Kosovo
would have been stronger if the General Assembly authorized
the intervention. Nonetheless, there is a strong argument that it
is permissible under Articles 106 and 43 of the Charter.
II. Li rriNG PRINCIPLES
For all of the above reasons, the decision to intervene in
Kosovo can be grounded firmly in the U.N. Charter. This, however, is not the end of the inquiry. For humanitarian intervention to be perceived as legitimate, further limiting principles
must be applied to guard against misapplication or exploitation.
In the colonial and cold war periods, the doctrine of humanitarian
intervention was at times misused by strong states as a pretext
for vigilante activity and for the occupation of weaker and politically disobedient countries. 179 Today, more than ever before, only
a few powerful states are in a position to use their economic and
military power on behalf of human rights.'8 ° Thus, the doctrine
remains open to "cynical manipulation. " 18 This need not be the
(1950).
178. See GA. Res. 498, U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 20A, at 1, U.N. Doc.
A/1775/Add.1 (1951) (calling upon states to lend assistance to U.N. action in Korea);
G.A. Res. 997-1002, U.N. GAOR, 1st Emergency Spec. Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 2, U.N.
Doc. A/3354 (1956) (authorizing an emergency international force to secure and supervise the Suez Canal crisis); G.A. Res. 1004-1008, U.N. GAOR, 2d Emergency
Spec. Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/3355 (1956) (resolving to furnish medical
and food relief to Hungary); GA. Res. 1474, U.N. GAOR, 4th Emergency Spec. Sess.,
Supp. No. 1, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/4510 (1960) (appealing to Members for contributions
to a United Nations Fund for the Congo).
179. See, e.g., Ian Brownlie, Thoughts on Kind-Hearted Gunmen, in HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 139, 147-48 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1973);
Oscar Schachter, The Lawful Resort to Unilateral Use of Force, 10 YALE J. INT'L L.
291, 294 (1985). The I.C.J. warned of such abuse of humanitarian intervention by
stronger countries in the Corfu Channel Case. See Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.),
1949 I.C.J. 4, 35 (Apr. 9) ("Intervention . .. would be reserved for the most powerful States, and might easily lead to perverting the administration of international
justice itself.").
180. See RICHARD FALK, HUMAN RIGHTS AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY 85 (1981).
181. Milner S. Ball, Ironies of Intervention, 13 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 313, 314
(1983) ([A] rule of non-intervention commends itself to us because the contrary rule
so readily falls prey to cynical manipulation."); see also Roger S. Clark, Humanitarian
Intervention: Help to Your Friends and State Practice, 13 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.

2000]

LESSONS FROM KOSOVO

1779

case, however. Drawing from the U.N. Charter itself, U.N. Security Council resolutions, and other international instruments,
particularly those pertaining to humanitarian law, it is possible
to identify workable criteria that limit the182scope of humanitarian
intervention and enhance its legitimacy.
Humanitarian intervention preferably would be carried out by
the United Nations according to the provisions of the U.N. Charter, or at least through regional organizations with prior Security
Council authorization. 8" In light of the U.N. Charter's goal of
conflict minimalization,'" where there are treaty procedures, the
relevant mechanisms should be attempted first, unless more immediate and forcible action is overwhelmingly necessary. 8 5 Intervention should be carried out only by individual states or collective alliances if, as in Kosovo, international organizations have
failed to address the human rights abuses. 86 The intervening
states should not have interests in the affairs of the target state
beyond the human rights concerns. 8 7 Although the motives of
states will likely be mixed, at the very least those motives need to
be overridingly humanitarian rather than self-interested. 8 8 Intervention need not be requestedby the target state; otherwise, it
would not be humanitarian intervention, but instead better char-

211, 213 (1983); Franck & Rodley, supra note 42, at 284.
182. Numerous scholars have advanced criteria for limiting humanitarian intervention. See, e.g., JOHN NORTON MOORE, LAW AND THE INDO-CHINA WAR 186 (1972);
Thomas E. Behuniak, The Law of Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention by Armed
Force: A Legal Survey, 79 MIL. L. REV. 157, 186-90 (1978); Fonteyne, supra note
165, at 258-68; Lillich, supra note 47, at 344-51; Ved P. Nanda, Tragedies in Northern Iraq, Liberia, Yugoslavia and Haiti-Revisiting the Validity of Humanitarian
Intervention Under International Law (pt. 1), 20 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POLYr 305, 330
(1992); Ved P. Nanda, The United States Action in the 1965 Dominican Crisis: Impact on World Order (pt. 2), 44 DEN. L.J. 225, .267-74 (1967); David J. Scheffer,
Toward a Modern Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention, 23 U. TOL. L. REV. 253,
290-91 (1992); Jane M.O. Sharp, Appeasement, Intervention and the Future of Europe,
in MILITARY INTERVENTION IN EUROPEAN CONFLICTS 34, 34-55 (Lawrence Freedman
ed., 1994).
183. See Bazyler, supra note 144, at 602; Fonteyne, supra note 165, at 266-67;
Reisman, supra note 47, at 188.
184. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 3.
185. See Fonteyne, supra note 165, at 264.
186. See Lillich, supra note 47, at 347-48; Benjamin, supra note 53, at 143.
187. See Lillich, supra note 47, at 350-51 (noting the impossibility of total disinterest).
188. See Bazyler, supra note 144, at 601-02.
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8 9 An alternative form of
acterized as humanitarian assistance."
consent would require that the "victims of oppression must welcome the intervention" as opposed to the government of the target
state. 90 Although it is unclear exactly how such consent would be
obtained,' 9 ' manifestations of the negative-the lack of consent
-would be easier to detect.
A case for humanitarian intervention can be made when the
human rights abuses are extreme and verifiable-that is, when
the human rights abuses "shock the conscience." 92 Specific circumstances warranting intervention might include "natural and
human-made disasters, genocide, other large-scale human rights
atrocities, and internal aggression placing large numbers of people in life-threatening danger." 9 s The case for intervention is particularly strong when the following criteria are met: (1) the abus-

es threaten widespread loss of human life; (2) intervention would

likely avert a disaster; (3) the ongoing nature of the problem
threatens the peace and security of the region; and (4) there has
been a good faith attempt to use diplomatic and peaceful means
of settlement.'94 All of these factors were present in Kosovo.
189. See ANTHONY CLARK AREND & ROBERT J. BECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
USE OF FORCE 128 (1993) ([Alction must not be pursuant to the invitation by the
legitimate government of the target state or done with that government's explicit
consent ....
") The crucial distinction between humanitarian assistance and humanitarian intervention is that the former is noncoercive and carried out with the consent, or at least acquiescence, of the state concerned. See Danesh Sarooshi, Humanitarian Intervention and International Humanitarian Assistance: Law and Practice,
Wilton Park Paper 86, at 1 (Nov. 1993).
190. TESON, supra note 47, at 126.
191. See id. (recognizing that tyrants often suppress popular expression).
192. OPPENHEIM, supra note 165, at 312. For a definition of "shocking the conscience," see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 702 & cmt. m (1987).
193. Arnison, supra note 114, at 208. Michael Reisman would also find legal humanitarian intervention warranted if undertaken to overthrow despotic and/or undemocratic regimes (without specific reference to human rights abuses). See W. Michael Reisman, Coercion and Self-Determination: Construing Charter Article 2(4), 78
AM. J. INVL L. 642, 643-44 (1984). D'Amato has made a similar argument. See
Anthony D'Amato, The Invasion of Panama Was a Lawful Response to Tyranny, 84
AM. J. INT'L L. 516, 516 (1990). Given the great possibility that so-called "democratic
interventions" could be misused for political and economic gain by the intervening
state, however, interventions should not be permitted in the absence of demonstrable
evidence of gross human rights abuses. See Oscar Schachter, The Legality of ProDemocratic Invasion, 78 AM. J. INTL L. 645, 649 (1984).
194. With regard to the latter limitation, good faith attempts should not be per-
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The only question is whether the means and method of intervention were appropriate.1 95 There is no need to come up with a
new checklist of limitations for the means and methods of military intervention particular to humanitarian situations. Indeed,
the laws of war already provide comprehensive restrictions.19 6
The most fundamental principle of the law of war is that combatants must be distinguished from noncombatants and military
objectives distinguished from protected property or protected
places, such as civilian property, cultural and religious property,
and places. 9 7 To this end, the 1977 Protocol Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of 1949 (Protocol I) provides that "the civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not
be the object of attack."198 Protocol I specifically prohibits "[aicts
or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread
terror among the civilian population...."' 99 In provisions that
are considered customary international law,200 Protocol I protects
civilians from "[iindiscriminate attacks." 20 1 Attacks are considered indiscriminate when they are "not directed at a specific
military objective; " 20 2 "employ a method or means of combat
which cannot be directed at a specific military objective"0 ' (fot
example, "bombing in certain populous areas, such as a bom-

mitted to lead to morally unjustifiable delay. See R. George Wright, A Contemporary
Theory of HumanitarianIntervention, 4 FLA. J. INTL L. 435, 455-56 (1989).
195. See Tom Farer, A Paradigm of Legitimate Intervention, in ENFORCING RESTRAINT. COLLECTIVE INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL CONFLICTS 316, 327 (Lori Fisler
Damrosch ed., 1993).
196. The main sources of law for the laws of war include: The Conventions of the
1907 Hague Peace Conference, the Geneva Conventions of 1949, the 1977 Geneva
Protocols, and customary international law. See DOCUlENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR

(Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff eds., 2d ed. 1989); Howard S. Levie, The Laws of
War and Neutrality, in NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 307 (John Norton Moore et al. eds.,

1990).
197. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977,
art. 48, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 25 [hereinafter Protocol I]; OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK,
supra note 61, at 7-5, 7-9 to 7-10.
198. Protocol I, supra note 197, art. 51, para. 2, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 25.
199. Id.
200. See OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 61, at 10-2
201. Protocol I, supra note 197, art. 51, para. 4, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 26.
202. Id. art. 51, para. 4(a), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 26.
203. Id. art. 51, para. 4(b), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 26.
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bardment 'which treats as a single military objective a number
of clearly separated and distinct military objectives in a city,

town, or village..

.,,,);204

or "employ a method or means of com-

bat the effects of which cannot be limited as required" 5 by the
protocol (for example, attacks that may cause collateral damage
"excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated").0 6
In addition to limiting the choice of targets, humanitarian law
limits the means of attack. Article 57 of Protocol I is of particular relevance because it requires military planners to "take all
feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing,
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to
civilian objects."20 7 Military planners must provide effective advance warning of attacks that may affect the civilian population.0 8 Whether NATO can justify its actions in accordance with
these requirements remains to be seen. Grave concerns were
raised by the number of accidental attacks on nonmilitary targets, due in some cases to planes flying at high altitudes where
verification of targets was impossible20 9 and, in other cases, to
faulty intelligence2 10 and apparent acts of negligence. 11 Clearly,

204. OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 61, at 5-5 (citing Protocol I, supra
note 195, art. 51, para. 5(a)).
205. Protocol I, supra note 197, art. 51, para. 4(c), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 26.
206. Id. art. 51, para. 5(a), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 26.
207. Id. art. 51, para. 2(a)(ii), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 29.
208. See id. art. 57, para. 2(c), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 29. Human Rights Watch has
alleged that NATO failed to give adequate warning before bombing the television
stations. See Letter from Human Rights Watch to Javier Solana, NATO Secretary
General (May 13, 1999) [hereinafter Solana Letter], in Human Rights Watch Letter
to NATO Secretary General Javier Solana (last modified May 13, 1999) <httpi/www.
hrw.org/ hrw/campaigns/kosovo98/solana.shtml>.
209. For example, on April 12, 1999, NATO bombed a civilian passenger train that
was crossing a bridge, and on April 14, 1999, NATO attacked civilian refugee vehicles in Kosovo. See Michael Dobbs & Karl Vick, Scores of Refugees Killed on Road:
NATO Says Jets Aimed at Military, WASH. POST, Apr. 15, 1999, at Al.
210. The bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade apparently was due to
faulty intelligence. See Steven Pearlstein, NATO: Bombs Aimed in Error: China's
Embassy Hit Instead of Supply Building, WASH. POST, May 9, 1999, at Al; Daniel
Williams, NATO Missiles Hit Chinese Embassy: Alliance Again Pounds Belgrade,
WASH. POST, May 8, 1999, at Al.
211. For example, the April 5, 1999 bombing of Aleksinac, a village about one hun-
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the bombing was designed in order to avoid any allied casualties
and to do so entailed a greater risk that civilians would be hit.
It is not within the spirit of the Geneva Convention IV and Protocol I to greatly-and, one could say, "disproportionately"
risk to civilians merely to avoid casualties of your
-increase the
2 12
own military.
Also troubling is the choice of targets in the NATO campaign
and the inadequacy of its efforts to limit civilian casualties in
Kosovo.' s U.S. Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen stated at
the outset of the NATO campaign: "[NATO is] attacking the
military infrastructure that President Milosevic and his forces
are using to repress and kill innocent people. NATO forces are
not attacking the people of Yugoslavia."214 Nonetheless, in the
third week of the bombing, NATO forces began to target electrical facilities in Serbia proper, depriving much of the civilian
population of electricity. 215 NATO also targeted the factories and
other property belonging to supporters of Yugoslav President
Slobodan Milosevic, Yugoslav television and radio stations,
bridges, and civilian cars."' All of these targets may be considered "dual-use" objects; that is, they may be used by the military
as well as civilians. Under Protocol I, these "dual-use" objects
may be legitimately targeted only if, "by their nature, location,
purpose or use [they] make an effective contribution to military
action," and their capture, neutralization or destruction, "in the

dred miles south of Belgrade, apparently was due to negligence. See Human Rights
Watch, NATO Urged to Respect HumanitarianLaw: Inquiry into Aleksinac Bombing
Demanded (Apr. 7, 1999) <http://www.hrw.org/hrw/press/1999/apr/kosovG407.htm>.
212. One could not kill 1,000 Serbian or Albanian civilians in order to save one
allied pilot. This would violate the principle of proportionality. The author is in debt
to Paul Szasz for this point.
213. See Human Rights Watch, Kosovo Human Rights Flash #37: Growing Concern
About NATO Violating the Laws of War (May 12, 1999) <http-J/www.hrw.org/campaignslKosovo98/flash6.html#37>. See generally Human Rights Watch, Select Chronology of NATO Attacks, March 24-May 7, 1999 (last modified May 18, 1999) <http:J/
www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/Kosovo/Kosovo-Chrongology9.html>.
214. Secretary of Defense, William S. Cohen & CJCS Gen. Shelton, DoD News
Briefing (Mar. 24, 1999).
215. See Philip Bennett & Steve Col, NATO Warplanes Jolt Yugoslav Power Grid,
WASH. POST, May 25 1999, at Al.
216. Human Rights Watch identified these incidents in a letter stating its concerns
under international law to NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana. See Solana Letter, supra note 208.
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circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage."217 Whether all of the targets fulfill these criteria is
open to question.21
First, it is unclear whether all the targets chosen made an
effective contribution to Serbia's military action. The media
targets, to take one difficult example, were instrumental in
spreading propaganda throughout Serbia and, by fostering a
sense of Serbian victimization, made it easier for them to justify
being perpetrators.21 Unlike the case of Rwanda, where the
media disseminated directions for committing genocide, the
media in Serbia did not disseminate military instructions.22 The
Serb media was not as clearly related to Serbia's military actions.
Permissible targets do not encompass acts intended to "spread
terror among the civilian population" because Protocol I prohibits these actions specifically.22 ' If the purpose of targeting the
media, one of the most visible pillars of Serb society, was to
spread terror among civilians, the targeting of the media was
against international law under Portocol I. Similarly, if the
purpose of targeting the electrical grid was to demoralize and
terrorize the civilian population and not to achieve a concrete
military objective, that target was impermissible under Protocol I.
Moreover, even if NATO believed that each of their targets
were serving a military purpose, the target would have been
forbidden if "the attack [was] expected to cause incidental loss of
civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects...
which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct
military advantage anticipated.""' This evokes the principle of
proportionality.2" As embodied in Protocol I, the concept of pro-

217. Protocol I, supra note 197, art. 52, para. 2, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 27.
218. See Raju G.C. Thomas, NATO and International Law 91 6 (visited Apr. 1,
2000) <http'//www.jurist.law.pitt.edu/thomas.htm>.
219. See MERTUS, supra note 131, at 4.
220. See ABCNews.com, Is NATO Crossing the Line?: -Chat with International Law
Professor Hurst Hannum (May 14, 1999) <http'/www.abcnews.go.comlsections/world/
DailyNews/Chat..hannum990514.html>.
221. Protocol I, supra note 197, art. 52, para. 2, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 26.
222. Id. art. 57, para. 2(b), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 29.
223. See Judith Gail Gardam, Proportionality and Force in International Law, 87
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portionality requires an ends-oriented comparative assessment:
"The loss of life and damage to property incidental to attacks
must not be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage expected to be gained."" If military planners are
able to realize their goals without loss of civilian life, Protocol I
suggests that they should change their course of action accordingly. Even assuming the targeting of the media was legitimate,
military planners should have planned their attacks in a way
that minimized civilian casualties. Yet, there is evidence to suggest that this did not happen. Indeed, Hurst Hannum has suggested that "the same result of knocking the media off the air
could have been achieved by attacking transmission towers rather
stations in which civilians were likely to
than the broadcasting
225
be found."
Other specific NATO targets are difficult to justify under the
principle of proportionality. NATO's decision to target civilian
factories owned by political associations of Milosevic, for example, does not appear to fit an ends-oriented assessment.2 As
Human Rights Watch observed in a letter to U.N. SecretaryGeneral Javier Solana:
Quite apart from civilian factories alleged to have served the
military purpose of producing weapons or military supplies,
several civilian factories seem to have been targeted simply
because they were owned or operated by political cronies or
supporters of Milosevic.... Despite the political motivation
for these attacks, the destruction of these objects seems to
have offered no "concrete and direct" military advantage that
might have justified the attacks under humanitarian law. 2
Similarly, NATO's attacks on Serbia's electrical grid were
likely to have a severe impact on civilians in exchange for limited
military utility. "[A] modern military such as Yugoslavia's will

AM. J. INTL L. 391, 391 (1993).
224. OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 61, at 7-4 (emphasis omitted); see
MCDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 53, at 241-44; Protocol I, supra note 197, art.
57, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 29.
225. ABCNews.com, supra note 220.

226. See Solana Letter, supra note 208.
227. Id.
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have back-up generators to service its military facilities, meaning that the attacks on civilian electrical transformers will have
little if any lasting impact on the country's ability to wage
war."22 8 The targeting of the electrical transformers was also
suspect under Article 54 of Protocol I, which prohibits the destruction of objects that are indispensable to the survival of the
civilian population. 2 9 Although not specifically mentioned in
Protocol I, electrical transformers can be considered an indispensable object for modern societies such as Serbia, and the
bombing of these transformers therefore was suspect."'
Aside from pointing to specific bombing targets, the overall
course of the NATO bombing can be called to task under the
principle of proportionality. Throughout the bombing campaign,
the principle of proportionality required NATO to undertake
action designed to elicit some permissible objective. To the extent that the bombing campaign was viewed as necessary for
ending human rights abuses and returning deported civilians,
the action was within the scope of international law. Unavoidable and unplanned damage to civilian targets incurred
while attacking legitimate military targets---collateral damage"'-was within the law.2 3 ' Yet, the action became questionable
when it became apparent that the bombing was not advancing
military objectives effectively, but rather was felt mainly by Serb
civilians. When it became clear that the military means chosen
were poorly related to the desired ends, the means should have
been changed-that is, either ground troops should have been
introduced along with the bombing or the bombing should have
been halted and other means employed.
Accordingly, although the decision of NATO to intervene in
Kosovo was legal, and the means and methods of the intervention were permissible initially, the NATO campaign, in the absence of sufficient evidence to the contrary,2 32 appears to have
228. Id.
229. See Protocol I, supra note 197, art. 54, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 27.
230. See Solana Letter, supra note 208.
231. "While no law of war treaty defines this concept, its inherent unlawfulness is
implicit in treaties referencing the concept." OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra
note 61, at 7-4 (indicating, however, that incidental damage does not result in a
violation of international law).
232. NATO should be given the opportunity to provide evidence that it met the
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engaged in illicit conduct. It is ironic that after participating in
flagrant violations of humanitarian law in Croatia, Bosnia, and
Kosovo, 3' the Serbs now have a claim of victimhood.2s In order
to preserve the legitimacy of international law, any arguments
of illegality in the use of force must be investigated thoroughly.
CONCLUSION
A close reading of the U.N. Charter supports humanitarian
intervention in Kosovo. Although the explicit Charter provisions
permitting force do not appear to be applicable to the intervention in Kosovo, the Charter may be read as implicitly permitting
and even mandating the action. Indeed, the strongest justifications for humanitarian intervention in Kosovo are linked to
affirmative human rights concerns, subject to substantive and
procedural limitations. Although the intervention in Kosovo was
initially within the limits of international law, claims that the
bombing campaign eventually strayed outside these limits warrant serious investigation. Meaningful humanitarian intervention does not threaten world order. Rather, it vindicates the
fundamental principles upon which the United Nations was
founded.

proscriptions of international humanitarian law.
233. See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, Multiple Eyewitnesses Confirm Killings Around
Velika Krusa, Kosovo: Clear Policy of "Ethnic Cleansing" (Apr. 2, 1999)
<http://www.hrw.org/hrw/press/1999/apr/kosovo4O2.htm>.
234. In a suit filed before the International Court of Justice (I.C.J.) on April 29,
1999, Yugoslavia alleged, among other claims, that the NATO attack violated the

Geneva Convention of 1949 and Protocol I. See Legality of Use of Force Order
(Yugo. v. U.S.), 1999 I.C.J. 114 (June 2), available in <http'//www.icj-cji.orgicjwww
/idocketliyus/iyusframe.htm>. On June 2, 1999, the ICJ rejected the request for the
indication of provisional measures submitted by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
See id. The Court, having found that it manifestly lacked jurisdiction to entertain
the case, ordered by twelve votes to three that it be removed from the List. See id.

